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Accountability in the Administrative Law Judiciary:
The Right and the Wrong Kind*
By Edwin L. Felter, Jr.* *

Accountability, n. The mother of caution.
-Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary

I.

INTRODUCTION

How many forms of accountability are there in the administrative
And, by comparison, how many forms of
law judiciary?
accountability are there in the judicial branch? Let me count the
ways. This article begins with an analysis of the interplay, and
mutual dependence of, judicial independence and accountability. It
next illustrates how various judicial philosophies maintain different
ideas about judicial accountability. Thereafter, an analysis of the
importance of judicial independence to our system ofjustice follows.
Delving into more specific forms of judicial accountability, the
article moves from accountability through "reasoned elaboration," as
an underpinning of meaningful appellate rights, to accountability
through judicial review, and the requirement that lower tribunals
* This article was originally published by the Denver University Law Review
in 2008 and can be located at 86 Denv. U.L. Rev. 157 (2008). J. NAALJ obtained
the permission to reprint this article from both the Denver University Law Review
and the author.
** Edwin L. Felter, Jr. is Senior Administrative Law Judge at the Colorado
Office of Administrative Courts. He was Chief Judge from 1983 to 1998. He is
also an Adjunct Professor of Law at the University of Denver Sturm College of
Law, 2006 to present. He was Chair of the National Conference of the
Administrative Law Judiciary, Judicial Division, American Bar Association, in
2001. Judge Felter acknowledges the research assistance of Law Clerks Audrey
Buehring, Elizabeth Meyer, and Kelly Williams.
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must follow precedent in all but the most unusual instances. The
article illustrates the implications of an official refusal to follow
precedent, for example, the Social Security Administration's (SSA)
policy of non-acquiescence (which maintains that SSA administrative
law judges need not follow precedent established by federal circuit
courts of appeal outside the circuit in which the administrative law
judge sits).
The next form of accountability with which this article deals is
the most significant and compelling form of accountability, the
accountability of judges to the controlling codes of judicial conduct
in their jurisdictions, the underpinnings of which are effective
complaint mechanisms to enforce those codes. For the sake of
comparison to the administrative law judiciary, there is an analysis of
disciplinary mechanisms for judges in state judicial branches. Also,
there is an analysis of the newer phenomenon of judicial performance
commissions in the states (which, in theory, exist to assist judges in
improving their performance).
Judgmental evaluations (evaluations that may result in pay raises,
demotions, or even firings) are contrasted with developmental
evaluations (for the purpose of self-improvement) of administrative
law judges.
Lastly, inappropriate judicial performance evaluations and their
negative consequences on the American values of integrity,
impartiality, and judicial independence of our judges are considered.
II. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Jane Q. Public cherishes independent judges, especially when she
prevails over the establishment in court, or before an administrative
law tribunal. Yet, she demands judges who are accountable. The
proposition is as simple as the idea that freedom comes with certain
Judicial independence comes with great
responsibilities.
accountability.
Judges have a great deal of power over the lives and fortunes of
those who appear before them. It is not always obvious to the litigant
that judges are constrained to apply the law to the facts, to obey
codes of judicial conduct and, in the case of the administrative law
judiciary, to meet specific performance objectives for civil servants,
plus observe the rules of professional conduct for lawyers.
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Perhaps the greatest source of misunderstanding (and demand for
more accountability) concerning judges stems from their remoteness
from the public, which is based in part on the standards of conduct
contained in the code of judicial conduct.' Also, the process by
which judges arrive at decisions in cases is sometimes mysterious to
the public. In ancient times, people believed that judges were merely
interpreting the divine will. 2 This concept evolved into the belief that
judges' interpretations of the law became a sacrosanct component of
our jurisprudence. The concept extended down to the trial level
whereby the trial judge's findings of fact were considered to become
the absolute and immutable truth concerning the facts in controversy.
The findings assumed a quality of unassailable dignity, above and
beyond the evidence upon which they were based. The school of
judicial realism maintains that judges should not deceive themselves
concerning the true nature of their findings of fact-guesses on the
guesses of the witness's human and imperfect grasp of the facts. 3
Judges have an obligation to avoid fueling the fires of arrogance and
misunderstanding. What judges do is not by consecration into the
holy order of the robe. They are technicians who apply the law to the
facts and, in doing this the application of the law should be laced
with human understanding, common sense, compassion, and justice.
Indeed, judges (through codes of judicial conduct) are, in fact,
subject to higher standards of conduct than those applicable to
lawyers, who are subject to the rules of professional conduct. Judges
in the administrative law judiciary-insofar as they must be attorneys
in good standing-are also subject to the rules of professional
conduct for lawyers in addition to judicial ethics codes and civil
service performance standards.
There is a public clamor for more accountability of judges,
especially when a legally correct, but unpopular and misunderstood
opinion, is released by an appeals tribunal and receives a lot of press
Indeed, if judges do not ensure that accountability
coverage.

1.

AMERICAN

BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Canon 1 (2007).
2. Charles D. Reid, Jr., JudicialPrecedent in the Late Eighteenth and Early
Nineteenth Centuries: A Commentary on ChancellorKent's Commentaries, 5 AVE
MARIA L. REV. 47, 52 (2007).
3. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN
JUSTICE, (Princeton Univ. Press 1973).
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measures and mechanisms, meaningful to the public, are in place,
interest groups, through citizen initiated constitutional amendments,
will get ill-advised and inappropriate accountability measures on the
ballot, and launch expensive campaigns to defeat judges whose
"minds are not right," in the opinion of a few crusaders to get-thejudges. One extreme example was South Dakota's 2006 "Jail for
Judges" initiative (J.A.I.L: Judicial Accountability Initiative Law),
which would have abolished judicial immunity for South Dakota
judges and made them liable in criminal and civil actions for official
There is no
acts, deemed improper by dissatisfied litigants.4
is a right
"judicial
immunity"
that
for
the
proposition
authority
protected by the U.S. Constitution. Judicial immunity, in some cases,
may be statutory, or in a state constitution (within the "sovereign
immunity" family), but it has mainly evolved through case law.'
Fortunately, South Dakota voters defeated the "Jail for Judges"
measure by eighty percent, thus indicating that they valued judges
who could function "without fear or favoritism." It is hard to
imagine who would want to be a judge in South Dakota if the "Jail
for Judges" measure had passed.
Rebecca Love Kourlis, former Colorado Supreme Court Justice
and present Executive Director for the Institute for the Advancement
of the American Legal System at the University of Denver, states,
"there is a buzz of public dissatisfaction about our courts, fueled at
least to some extent by the perception that our courts and judges are
remote and unaccountable."6 She also states:
The willingness of judicial leaders in places like
Colorado, Utah, and New Hampshire to promote
accountability measures is heartening and heralds a
new mind-set among judges. This new judicial
attitude is also reflected in eloquent remarks by Chief
Justice John Broderick of New Hampshire, who is
working to export key elements of Colorado's
[Chief Justice
program to their court system.
Broderick observed] "Our best ally is public trust and
4. S.D. CONST. amend. E (2006).
5. See Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th Cir. 1985).
6. Rebecca Love Kourlis, Op-Ed, Guest Commentary: Colorado Judiciary a
Leader, THE DENVER POsT, June 29, 2008, at D3 (emphasis added).
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confidence. Without it, we will lose support. . . .
Sunlight and openness purify."7
Justice Kourlis indicates: "We have now also taken to measuring
the courts, from public opinion polls, to state-by-state rankings and
performance evaluations. This is a very healthy development."
Although the administrative law judiciary often "flies under the
radar," perhaps because administrative law has a reputation for being
a boring subject, the administrative law judiciary could be especially
vulnerable if an interest group, affected by a decision of the
administrative law judiciary it did not like, decided to launch a
campaign to make the administrative law judiciary more
"accountable" to the group's preferred way of thinking about issues.
The reason for the greater vulnerability would be due to the narrow
and specialized subject matter with which the administrative law
judiciary deals.
Indeed, some members of the public believe that administrative
law judges are mere extensions of the agencies that are at odds with
them. Nothing could be further from the truth. Administrative law
judges stand between the agency and the person. The agency stands
as another litigant before the administrative law judge, and the
administrative law judge's job is to provide a fair and impartial
hearing to all sides. Sometimes the agency loses and it has the right
to appeal in the same manner as any other appellant.
III. .JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHIES AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Colorado State Senator Mark Hillman, who the author describes
as a textualist, states: "Conservatives have long decried 'activist
Those terms have a specific
judges' and 'judicial activism.'
meaning, referring to courts that do not simply interpret the law but
instead change the meaning of the law under the guise of
interpretation." 9 The Senator goes on to state: "Writing the law is the

7. Id.
8. Rebecca Love Kourlis, Perspective: Do Our Courts Measure Up?, THE
at
11,
2008,
available
POST,
July
DENVER
http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci_9844319.
9. Senator Mark Hillman, The Essence ofJudicialActivism, John Jay Institute
(Mar.
15,
2004)
Interpretation
Journal
for
Judicial
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constitutional role of the legislative branch, which is elected by and
accountable to the people. The role of the judiciary is to interpret,
which The American Heritage Dictionarydefines as 'to explain the
meaning of."' 0 Therein lies some public misunderstanding and
dissatisfaction with some high profile judicial opinions, perceived to
be the product of "activist" judges. Political campaigns against these
opinions add more fuel to the fires of misunderstanding.
Judicial philosophies, labeled as textualism" and originalism,' 2
are the banners under which those calling for more judicial
accountability often fly. Pragmatism' 3 (which has become the
http://www.libertyparkusafd.org/lp/Jay/Joumal/2004/
The%20Essence%20of/o20Judicial%2OActivism.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2008).
10. Id.
11. "Textualism" looks to the ordinary meaning of the language of the text, not
merely the possible range of meaning of each of its constituent words. See K Mart
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 319 (1988). Justice Scalia has written:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be
determined, not on the basis of which meaning can be shown to
have been understood by a larger handful of the members of
Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in
accord with context and ordinary usage, and the most likely to
have been understood by the whole Congress which voted on the
words of the statute, (not to mention the citizens subject to it),
and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into
which the provision must be integrated-a compatibility which,
by benign fiction, we assume Congress always has in mind.
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
12. "Though I have written of the understanding of the ratifiers of the
Constitution, since they enacted it and made it law, that is actually a shorthand
formulation, because the ratifiers understood themselves to be enacting must be
taken to be what the public of that time would have understood the words to mean."
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 144 (The Free Press 1990)
(emphasis added).
13. "[T]he pragmatist judge believes that constitutional interpretation involves
the empathic projection of the judge's mind and talent into the creative souls of the
framers rather than slavish obeisance to the framers' every metronome marking. In
the capacious, forward-looking account of interpretation that I am calling
pragmatic, the social consequences of alternative interpretations often are decisive;
to the consistent originalist, if there were such a person, they would always be
irrelevant." RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 253 (Harvard Univ. Press
1995).
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subject of public opprobrium among those clamoring for more
"judicial accountability") bears the stigma of judicial liberalism and
those who appear to subscribe to this philosophy are often labeled as
"judicial legislators," or "judicial activists."
The late Justice
Thurgood Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court, in response to a
question about the "original intent" of the founding fathers, reputedly
indicated that the founding fathers did not contemplate the law of the
air or space. Justice Marshall was considered a judicial legislator by
some because he would be flexible in interpreting the law of
transport for horses and buggies as applicable to aircraft and space
craft.
IV. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: AN AMERICAN VALUE

In 2001, when I was Chair of the National Conference of the
Administrative Law Judiciary of the American Bar Association, I
was invited to speak at an international administrative law conference
in Quebec City, the theme of which was "Universal Values in
Administrative Law."' 4 I decided on a presentation entitled "Judicial
Independence: A Universal Value." Part of the presentation made
reference to Steven Spielberg's 1997 movie Amistad, starring Djimon
Hounsou as the leader of the 1839 slave rebellion on the schooner
Amistad, and Anthony Hopkins, starring as John Quincy Adams, his
lawyer. A rebellion broke out on the schooner along the coast of
Cuba and the schooner was taken over by a group of captives who
had earlier been kidnapped in Africa and sold into slavery. The
Africans were later apprehended on the vessel near Long Island, New
York, by the U.S. Navy and taken into custody. Widely publicized
litigation ensued. The movie depicts one lonely federal judge
standing up against the administration of President Martin Van Buren
(whose administration, trying to avoid a conflict between North and
South, supported the property rights of those to whom the alleged
slaves were consigned) and Congress. The federal judge found that
the initial transport of the Africans across the Atlantic (which was not
on the Amistad) had been illegal and the rebels were not legally
slaves but free. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this finding on
14. Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Judicial Independence: A Universal Value, Speech at
the Council of Canadian Administrative Tribunals Fourth International
Administrative Law Conference, Quebec City, Quebec (June 2001).
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March 9, 1841, and the Africans traveled home in 1842.'1 The movie
presents a moving portrayal of the cherished American value of
judicial independence, standing firm against the weight of public
sentiment, Congress, and the presidential administration of Martin
Van Buren. Indeed, without judicial independence implementation
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may have been a long-time coming.
The decisional independence of judges, including judges in the
administrative law judiciary, is the cornerstone of our constitutional
system of separation of powers. Legislative bodies make the laws,
based on their perceptions of the popular will, and they have the
power to implement the laws through the power of appropriating
monies. The executive branch enforces the laws through its police
and sheriffs. The judicial branch, including the administrative law
judiciary (within the executive branch), has neither the power to
appropriate monies nor the police force to enforce its decrees. It has
been characterized as the weakest branch of government, yet it has
the last word. The judicial power lies in the public's silent and
enduring agreement to abide by the decisions of the judiciary, and to
treat the decisions as final unless appealed. Indeed, the judiciary's
legitimacy and efficacy derives largely from the public's confidence
in its fairness and fidelity to the law.' 6 Public confidence is essential
to the judicial branch.' 7 To citizens of those countries where
independent judiciaries are not a given, the respect Americans accord
judicial decisions (whether they agree or disagree) is a great mystery.
The administrative law judiciary is meant to represent a fair and
impartial mechanism in the executive branch, whereby the individual
person and the government agency stand on equal ground. Indeed,
the administrative law judge's obligation to be decisionally
independent is the same as the obligation of a judicial branch judge.
The late Chief Justice William Rehnquist said that an
independent judiciary is the "crown jewel of our democracy." 8 A

15. United States v. Libellants & Claimants of The Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S.
518, 597 (1841).
16. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 752 (1999).
17. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
18. Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Maintaining the Balance Between Judicial
Independence and Judicial Accountability in Administrative Law, 17 J. NAT'L
Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 89, 93 (1997).
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colleague tells a story about his experience as a civil procedure
consultant in Vietnam. He told his Vietnamese audience about the
U.S. Supreme Court opinion that affirmed a federal judge's decision
ordering President Harry Truman to cease and desist from barring a
strike of one of the nation's largest steel companies at the beginning
of the Korean War.19 A member of the audience asked if the judge
was taken out and shot. My colleague replied, "No, he went on to his
next docketed case." In our system, even the President of the United
States must obey court orders.
Judicial independence is a cherished international and national
value. The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002),20 Value
1, provides: "Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of
law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall
therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its
individual and institutional aspects." 21
Canon I of the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial
Conduct (2007) states: "A judge shall uphold and promote the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary . . . .
Most jurisdictions in the United States have provisions in their codes
of judicial conduct concerning the independence of the judiciary
similar to those in the ABA Model Code.2 3
Decisional independence, especially for members of the
administrative law judiciary, does not come without great
Indeed, the American Bar Association felt it
accountability.
necessary to adopt a resolution supporting the decisional

19. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
20. BANGALORE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2002) (adopted by the
Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity, as revised at the Round Table
Meeting of Chief Justices held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, November 25-26,
2002 (those countries participating included Brazil, the Czech Republic, Egypt,
France, Mexico, Mozambique, The Netherlands, Norway, The Philippines,
Madagascar, Hungary, Germany, Sierra Leone, United Kingdom, and the U.S.A)).
21. Id.; Value 1: Independence, Principle. Application 1.1 provides: "A judge
shall exercise judicial function independently (emphasis added) on the basis of the
judge's assessment of the facts in accordance with a conscientious understanding of
the law, free from any extraneous influences, pressures, threats, or interference,
direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason." Id.
22. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007).
23. See, e.g., COLO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007) (stating "A
judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.").
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independence of administrative law judges, conditioned on the
proposition that "members of the administrative [law] judiciary be
held accountable under appropriate ethical standards adapted from
the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct." 24
V. Accountability Through "Reasoned Elaboration" and the Right to
Appeal
Legislative bodies make decisions, based on public comment and
perceptions of the public will, without being required to support
those decisions with underlying reasons (other than a prefatory
statement in a bill to the effect: "In order to protect the public health,
safety and welfare . . . ."). Legislative decisions are reflected in bills

that become laws. The executive branch, charged with enforcing
those laws, may or may not be required to give reasons in support of
executive branch enforcement actions (administrative law
adjudications are not part of these enforcement actions). The
policeman making an arrest is not required to articulate underlying
reasons for doing so, other than stating the facts, which must
establish probable cause before a court. A court then decides
whether or not there was probable cause to believe that the subject
committed the crime and should be bound over for trial. Because
judicial branch decisions are not based on majority vote reflecting the
popular will, or on a clear mandate to enforce the law, one of the
forms of accountability for judicial outcomes is a requirement of
"reasoned elaboration," 25 applying the law to the facts and giving
reasons why the judge arrived at the specific outcome in the case.
The right to appeal is another form of accountability, whereby the
appeals tribunal must state reasons why the judge below was correct
or incorrect. This requirement is especially visible, and more
pronounced, in the administrative law judiciary, after an agency takes
24. ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES REs. 1011B (2001) (enacted) (on file with
author).
25. "Reasoned elaboration" is the notion that the rules and guidelines involved
in judicial decisionmaking are sufficient to create substantial constraint on both
process and outcome, and, when properly followed, will incline courts towards the
substantively best outcome. The constraints emphasized in "reasoned elaboration"
are public explanation, consistency, and sensitivity to (legislative) purpose.
ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSrIvISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 126-27,
138-42 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1998).
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final agency action on the administrative law judge's findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and order. Although the ALJ functions in the
executive branch, the ALJ performs a judicial function. In the
judicial branch, "reasoned elaboration" may not always be formally
required at the trial level. It most certainly is required at the appellate
level. "Reasoned elaboration" is almost universally prescribed by a
codified and formal mechanism at the first level of adjudication by
the administrative law judiciary. 26
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA),2 7 as well as
the APA of almost every state, 28threquires the administrative law
judge to articulate findings of fact and conclusions of law that tie the
26. See Professor Michael Frost, The Unseen Hand in Administrative Law
Decisions: OrganizingPrinciplesfor Findings ofFact & Conclusions ofLaw, 17 J.
NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 151, 171 (1997).
27. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(3) (2008) (providing "All decisions, including initial,

recommended, and tentative decisions ... shall include a statement of findings and
conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefore, on all material issues of fact, law or
discretion presented on the record .. . .").
28. ALA. CODE § 41-22-15 (2008); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1063 (2008);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-15-210 (West 2008); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11425.50 (West
2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-179 (West 2008); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 29, §
10128 (2008); D.C. CODE § 2-509(e) (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57(1)(k) (West
2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-17(b) (West 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 91-12
(2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5248 (2008); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/1050(a) (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-21.5-3-27 to -28 (West 2008); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 17A.16 (West 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-526 (2006); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13B.120 (West 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:958 (2008); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 9061 (2008); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOv'T § 10-221 (West
2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 11 (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.285
(2008); MINN. STAT. § 14.62 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-10(c) (West 2008);
N.M. STAT. § 12-8-12 (West 2008); N.Y. A.P.A. LAW § 307 (McKinney 2007);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 150B-34 (2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.09 (West
2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 75, § 311 (West 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-12
(2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-350 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-26-25
(2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-314 (2008); TEX. GOv'T CODE ANN. § 2001.141
(Vernon 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-208(1) (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §
812 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4020 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.461
(LexisNexis 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-5-3 (LexisNexis 2008); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 227.47 (West 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-110 (2008); see TEX. GOv'T
CODE ANN. § 2001.058(e) (Vernon 2008) (providing that "a state agency may
change a finding of fact" and must state written reasons for the legal basis of the
change); see also Shelia Bailey Taylor, The Growth and Development of a
Centralized Administrative Hearing Process in Texas, 17 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN.
L. JUDGES 113, 115 (1997).
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findings of fact into the applicable rules, statutes, or cases, and
stating the reasons for the decision. The Proposed Model State
Administrative Procedure Act (2008), requires that a recommended
or final order "must include separately stated findings of fact and
conclusions of law on all material issues of fact, law, or discretion .
. ."29 California's Administrative Procedure Act adds one more
measure of accountability in ALJ decisions: an ALJ is required to
articulate reasons supporting credibility determinations. 30 On judicial
review, the reviewing tribunal "shall give great weight to the
[credibility] determination" to the extent that it "identifies the
observed demeanor, manner, or attitude of the witness that supports
it." 3 1
VI. RIGHT TO APPEAL / ACCESS TO THE COURTS
The right of access to judicial review of executive branch actions
was first clearly pronounced in Marbury v. Madison.32 One hundred
and sixty-four years later, the U.S. Supreme Court announced a
presumption of reviewability of administrative agency actions,
including ALJ decisions.3 3 The Federal APA and each state APA
provides for judicial review of final administrative agency actions.3 4
APA provisions for judicial review set forth appellate standards
for correcting lower tribunal errors. The scrutiny of an appellate
tribunal is an important accountability measure for outcomes in
specific cases. Indeed, appeal is the appropriate remedy to address
legal errors at lower court and administrative agency levels.
Adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis, 35 or precedent, in the
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence provides another measure
of judicial accountability. Once a precedent-setting court has laid
29. MODEL STATE ADMIN. ACT § 417(d) (Proposed Draft 2008). The
corresponding provision in Colorado, for example, requires the same ingredients in
an ALJ decision. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-4-105(14)(a) (2008).
30. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11425.50(b) (2008).
3 1. Id.
32. 5 U.S. 137, 146 (1803).
33. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2008); see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-15-212 (2008);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 75, § 318 (2008).
35. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990) ("To abide by, or adhere
to, decided cases.").

Spring 2010

Accountability in the Administrative Law Judiciary

31

down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle, and apply it in all future cases, where the
facts are substantially the same.3 6 Nevertheless, when a judge
commits a legal error, appeal on the merits, as opposed to judicial
discipline, is usually the appropriate avenue of recourse. 37 Legal
error, however may amount to judicial misconduct in unusual cases,
making judicial discipline appropriate. Such recourse is highly
sensitive because of the potential impact on decisional
independence.3 8
In Oberholzer v. Commission on Judicial Performance,3 9 the
California Supreme Court distinguished legal error from judicial
misconduct, setting forth the following factors relevant to a finding
of misconduct: repeated error, bias, abuse of authority, disregard for
fundamental rights, intentional disregardof the law, or any purpose
other than the faithful discharge of judicial duty.4 0
In a highly publicized California case, Justice Anthony Kline (of
an intermediate appellate court) stated in a dissenting opinion that he
would decline to follow the decision of California's highest appellate
court, indicating that the opinion in question was "analytically flawed
and empirically unjustified," and Justice Kline opined that his dissent
constituted one of the "rare instances in which a judge of an inferior
court can properly refuse to acquiesce in the precedent established by
a court of superior jurisdiction." 4 1
Justice Kline was charged with "refusal to follow the law as
established by the California Supreme Court in violation of the Code
Ultimately, the Commission applied
of Judicial Ethics."4 2
Oberholzer standards and concluded that Justice Kline's "argument

36. Moore v. City of Albany, 98 N.Y. 396, 410 (1885).
37. See, e.g., In re Quigley, 32 N.Y.S. 828, 829 (1895); Murtagh v. Maglio,
195 N.Y.S.2d 900, 905 (1960); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Sullivan, 596 P.2d
864, 869 (Okla. 1979).
38. See Gerald Stem, Is JudicialDiscipline in New York a Threat to Judicial
Independence?, 7 PACE L. REv. 291, 303-45 (1987).
39. 20 Cal. 4th 371 (1999).
40. Id. at 397-98.
41. Morrow v. Hood Commc'ns, Inc., 59 Cal. App. 4th 924, 926-27 (1997)
(Kline, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied).
42. In re Kline, No. 151 (Cal. Comm'n on Jud. Performance August 19, 1999)
(decision and order of dismissal).
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for a narrow exception to the stare decisis principle . . . was [not] so

far-fetched as to be untenable." 43
Some agencies, however, have refused to adhere to stare decisis
as a matter of policy. In the 1920s, the Internal Revenue Service
created the concept of non-acquiescence as a method to inform
taxpayers of its intention not to follow a decision of the Board of Tax
Appeals, which Congress created to provide an independent tribunal
to hear taxpayer appeals. 4 4 The Social Security Administration
(SSA) follows a policy of non-acquiescence, which is that the SSA
only follows the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and not those
of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals unless it decides to change
regulations based on a court of appeals opinion, or unless the SSA
decides to acquiesce in a particular decision. Its rationale is to
maintain uniformity throughout the United States. 45 This policy
forces the SSA administrative law judges to choose between obeying
the administrators of the SSA, or following the law as interpreted by
the respective circuit court of appeals, as is ordinarily done by other
litigants.4 6
Anecdotally, a friend, who is a U.S. District Judge, characterizes
the SSA's policy of non-acquiescence as a "recipe for anarchy." The
author agrees and sees the policy as significantly undermining the
principle of stare decisis, which in fact extends into the
administrative law judiciary, and replacing the supremacy of the
courts with the supremacy of the executive branch bureaucracy at the
top of the SSA. This may be reminiscent of one of the banana belt
republics of yore, where the highest court of the country was
accountable to, and obeyed, the president of the republic.
Originalists and textualists must concede that this is not what our
founding fathers (original framers) had in mind.
43. Id.
44. Deborah Maranville, Nonacquiescence: Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts,
and the PerilsofPluralism,39 VAND. L. REv. 471, 474 n.5, 478 n.17 (1986).
45. See Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F.Supp. 1132, 1139
(D.D.C. 1984).
46. Robert E. Rains, A Specialized Court for Social Security? A Critique of
Recent Proposals, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 8-10 & n.60 (1987). For a thorough
discussion of the predicament of ALJs at the SSA, see Robin J. Arzt,
Recommendationsfor a New Independent Adjudication Agency to Make the Final
Administrative Adjudications of Social Security Act Benefits Claims, 23 J. NAT'L
Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 267 (2003).
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VII. Accountability to Codes of Judicial Conduct
A code ofjudicial conduct provides every canon or rule necessary
to make judges accountable in all respects. Administrative law
judges in three central panel 47 states (Colorado, Georgia and
Minnesota) are officially subject to the code of judicial conduct for
Several states provide that
the respective state's judicial branch.
the rules of professional conduct for attorneys apply to the ALJs. 49
Other states have adopted their own codes of judicial conduct,
patterned after the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct for State
Administrative Law Judges. 50
Members of a state administrative law judiciary, who are civil
servants, are subject to their respective constitutional provisions,
statutes, and rules dealing with performance of duties by state
employees, and providing sanctions for misconduct. In Colorado, for
instance, members of the administrative law judiciary are appointed
to their positions under the State Personnel System, which is in the
state constitution.5 1 According to the Colorado Constitution:
A person certified to any class or position in the
personnel system may be dismissed, suspended, or
otherwise disciplined by the appointing authority upon
written findings of failure to comply with standardsof
efficient service or competence, or for willful
47. A "central panel" is an independent agency in which a jurisdiction's
adjudications are centralized. Central Panels are best described as an executive
branch judiciary.
48. COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-30-1003(4)(a) (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-1340(c) (2008) (subjecting ALJs by virtue of the chief administrative law judge's
adoption of a rule); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.48(d) (2007).
49. COLO. OFFICE ADMIN. CTS., Comparison of Central Panel States Chart,
Table B (2003) (citing Arizona, California, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina,
North Dakota, and South Carolina) (on file with author).
50. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:996 (2008); MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T
§ 9-1604(a)(9) (2008) (stating that the Chief Administrative Law Judge is required
to develop a code of professional responsibility for administrative law judges); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-5 (2008); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 4-5-32 1(a)(4)(b) (2008); TEX.
Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2003.022(d)(3) (2008) (emulating the ABA Model Code for
State ALJs).
51. COLO. CONST. art. XII, § 13, cl. 8; see also Dep't of Insts. v. Kinchen, 886
P.2d 700, 704 (Colo. 1994) (en banc).
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misconduct, willful failure or inability to perform his
duties, or final conviction of a felony or any other
offense which involves moral turpitude ... .52
By virtue of the fact that the judicial branch code of judicial
conduct applies to the administrative law judges in Colorado's
central panel,53 it follows that a breach of the code of judicial conduct
would be either "failure to comply with standards" or "willful
misconduct" under the constitutional state personnel system and, if
proven after notice and a hearing, the ALJ could ultimately be
dismissed, suspended, or otherwise disciplined for a violation of the
code ofjudicial conduct.
The American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct
(2007) notes: "Each jurisdiction should consider the characteristics of
particular positions within the administrative law judiciary in
adopting, adapting, applying, and enforcing the Code for the
administrative law judiciary."5 4 The ABA Federal ALJ Model Code
and the ABA State ALJ Model Code are both endorsed by the ABA
National Conference of the Administrative Law Judiciary."
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the
applicability of the ABA's Model Code for Federal administrative
law judges and found that the Code is not binding on those judges
within the Social Security Administration because the SSA had not
specifically adopted it as binding.5 6
For the purposes of this article, reference is made to the ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct (2007) to illustrate tenets of conduct
in typical codes of judicial conduct. Also, the Bangalore Principles

52. COLO. CONST. art. XII, § 13, cl. 8 (emphasis added); see also COLO. REV.
§ 24-50-125(1) (2008).
53. COLO. OFFICE ADMIN. CTS., supra note 49.
54. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Application, pt. VI, cmt. n. 1 (2007);
see, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
STAT.

LAW JUDGES (1989); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (1995).
55. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Application, pt. VI, cmt. n.1 (2007);
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
(1989); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGES (1995).
56. Lowry v. Barnhart, 329 F.3d 1019, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2003).
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of Judicial Conduct (2002)57 set forth fundamental principles of
judicial conduct.
The ABA Model Code sets forth four principal canons: (1) "A
judge shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and
impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid the appearance of
impropriety"; (2) "A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office
impartially, competently, and diligently"; (3) "A judge shall conduct
the judge's personal and extrajudicial activities to minimize the risk
of conflict with the obligations of judicial office"; and (4) A judge or
candidate for judicial office shall not engage in political or campaign
activity that is inconsistent with the independence, integrity, or
impartiality of the judiciary. The canons, which state overarching
principles of judicial ethics, are broken down into rules, which are
enforceable in judicial disciplinary actions. 59
The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct present six judicial
ethics values: (1) Independence; (2) Impartiality; (3) Integrity; (4)
Propriety; (5) Equality; and (6) Competence and Diligence. These
values are broken down into tenets, referred to as "Application,"
which deal with more specific mandates relating to the specific
"Value." 60
The Bangalore Principles, the ABA Model Code, and all other
codes of judicial conduct set forth a comprehensive set of
performance standards for judicial branch and executive branch
An examination of the
judges (administrative law judges).
enforceable rules under the ABA Model Code illustrate that no other
performance standards are necessary in order to achieve a high
degree of judicial accountability.
For those administrative law judges who are not subject to a code
of judicial conduct, but only to the rules of professional conduct for
lawyers (assuming a law license is necessary to serve), the code of

57. See BANGALORE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Values, supra note
20.
58. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007); MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2007) (emphasis supplied); MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (2007); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4
(2007).
59. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Scope, para. 2 (2007).
60. See BANGALORE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Values, supra note

20.

36

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

30-1

judicial conduct is the only yardstick available to hold a lawyer and
administrative law judge accountable for misconduct of a purely
judicial nature. Indeed, judicial misconduct, when there is no
adopted code of judicial conduct, would amount to "conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice,"6 ' under the rules of
professional conduct for attorneys.
Administrative law judges who are licensed attorneys may be
subject to three separate legal schemes of accountability and
discipline: the code of judicial conduct; the rules of professional
responsibility for lawyers; and, civil service rules concerning ethical
and efficient standards of public service. If certain administrative
law judges are neither lawyers nor civil servants, they will be subject
to internal standards developed by their respective organizations, and
potentially to political accountability, depending on how politically
responsive their employing agencies are on adjudication issues. The
administrative law judges, however, may dodge the bullet of political
accountability depending upon the good graces of their supervisors
and their appointing authorities.
In Colorado for instance, a certified civil servant may be
"dismissed, suspended, or otherwise disciplined . . . upon written

findings of failure to comply with standards of efficient service or
competence, or for willful misconduct, willful failure or inability to
perform his duties, or final conviction of a felony or any other
offense which involves moral turpitude . . . ."62 Violation of the code
of judicial conduct in the performance of judicial duties qualifies as a
violation of the civil service provisions. For misconduct of a purely
judicial nature, attorney regulation systems and state appointing
authorities that are responsible for dealing with civil servant
misconduct and discipline, if appropriate, will use the code of judicial
conduct as a yardstick, whether or not it has officially been made
applicable.

61. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (1980).
62. COLO. CONST. art. XII, § 13(8); COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-50-125(1) (2007).
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VIII. An Effective Complaint System Is Necessary for
Accountability
Accountability to "reasoned elaboration," appeals on the merits,
codes of judicial conduct, and performance codes will only be
meaningful if an effective enforcement mechanism to address
misconduct exists. Such mechanisms exist for the federal judiciary,
and for the judiciary of every state in the U.S. 63 One hundred years
ago, the only way to remove a federal, Article III, judge was through
Now, there is a
impeachment and conviction by Congress."
judges. 65 State
federal
errant
of
discipline
mechanism for the
administrative law judges who are civil servants are accountable to
their respective state performance codes. These performance codes
derive authority either from the state constitution or from statutory
law.
Federal administrative law judges, who are under the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), are independent of the
agencies over whose adjudications they preside. The Office of
Personnel Management prescribes their pay without regard to agency
evaluations. 66 A federal agency cannot take disciplinary action
against a federal ALJ, who is under the Federal APA. The agency
stands in the position of a party litigant (complainant), and it must
establish that good cause for discipline exists through a formal
adjudicatory proceeding before the Merit System Protection Board
(MSPB), an independent agency that has its own independent
administrative law judges. The MSPB then may impose discipline, if
appropriate.67
State administrative law judges are treated as "employees" on the
one hand, and as "judicial officers" on the other hand.68 These
individuals either work in an agency or in an independent central
63. American Judicature Society, http://www.ajs.org/ethics/eth-conductorgs.asp (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
64. See Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal
Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 72 (2006).
65. See Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364
(2008).
66. 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2008).
67. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2008).
68. See Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Special Problems of State Administrative Law
Judges, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 403 (2001).
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panel.6 9 With the exception of New Jersey (the Governor appoints
each ALJ) and South Carolina (the House of Burgesses appoints each
ALJ), the Chief ALJ or Director of the central panel is usually the
appointing authority with the duty of hiring and firing ALJs. 7 0 The
power to hire and fire administrative law judges for the central panel
of the District of Columbia is in its Commission on Selection and
Tenure of Administrative Law Judges.7 ' In central panel states,
where the judges are civil servants, the chief's (appointing
authority's) firing decisions are subject to appeal to a state civil
service commission, which frequently has its own independent
administrative law judges.7 2 In jurisdictions without central panels,
administrative law judges are generally hired and fired by the agency
or by the agency's general counsel. In these jurisdictions, if the
agency employees are civil servants, the administrative law judges in
the agency are generally civil servants.
State administrative law judges who are civil servants are
ordinarily
accountable
through
"judgmental"
performance
evaluations, which could result in a firing, demotion, pay raise or
promotion. 73 "Judgmental evaluations" count in terms of pay, status,
tenure, promotion, demotion or firing, and they have been a fact of
life for state administrative law judges, who are civil servants, for a
long time. "Developmental evaluations" cannot affect pay, status,
tenure, promotion, demotion, or firing. They are for the edification
and improvement of the judge being evaluated. Developmental
evaluations are becoming more and more prevalent for the judicial

69. See Allen Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the
1990s, 46 ADMIN. L. REv. 75 (1994) (describing central panels as operating in
complete independence from agencies). At present there are 25 state central panels
(Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
North Carolina, North Dakota, New Jersey, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming), and three city central
panels (Chicago, New York City and Washington, D.C.) COLO. OFFICE ADMIN.
CTS., Comparison of OAC to Other Central Panels, Table A (on file with author).
70. COLO. OFFICE ADMIN. CTS., supra note 69.

71. D.C. CODE § 2-1831.11 (2008).
72. Felter, supra note 68, at 406 (including California, Colorado, Florida,
Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Washington, and
Wisconsin).
73. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 55.
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branch with the establishment of twenty state judicial performance
evaluation programs, 74 which are discussed in more detail below.
The results of developmental evaluations in the judicial branch, as
structured and analyzed below, can have career-ending consequences
for the judicial branch judges evaluated.
With the exception of the District of Columbia Office of
Administrative Hearings (where performance evaluations are done by
a commission 75 ), the chief administrative law judge usually ratifies
the one-on-one performance evaluation of a supervisory judge.
Potential flaws, and potential inappropriate influences on judicial
independence, are noted in an article indicating that the goals of any
system are often difficult to meet because of inherent weaknesses of
human beings. 76 Alexander Hamilton noted in the Federalist papers
that "in the general course of human nature, a power over a man's
subsistence amounts to a power over his will." 7 7 In contrast, judicial
branch performance evaluations may have less potential for being
flawed because they are done by commissions that are appointed in a
manner similar to the method of appointment for judicial discipline
commissions, and members of the commissions presumably end up
being accountable to each other.
Colorado's central panel of the administrative law judiciary sets
forth a detailed system for the handling of complaints against
administrative law judges on its website. 78 Section II (b) of the
policy states: "Complaints about a particular judge must be in
writing, and must be addressed to the Office Director (Chief
Judge)."7 9 Section III (a) provides: "In no instance shall the
complaint be disclosed to the judge during the pendency of the matter
in question." 80 Section III (c) states:
74. Rebecca Kourlis, Op-Ed., Colorado Judiciary a Leader, THE DENVER
POST, June 29, 2008, at D3.
75. D.C. CODE, supra note 71.
76. See Ann Marshall Young, Evaluation of Administrative Law Judges:
Premises, Means, and Ends, 17 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1 (1997).
77. THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
78. Colorado
Office
of
Administrative
Courts
Homepage,
http://www.colorado.gov/dpa/oac/DirectorsPolicies.htm (last visited Oct. 18,
2008).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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Following the final conclusion of the matter, the Chief
Judge shall discuss the complaint with the judge (this
includes an investigation, if necessary) to determine
whether it is well grounded and whether any changes
are warranted. Complaints found to be both warranted
and serious may be made a part of the judge's
personnel file (inherently included in such a finding is
the potential of discipline, up to and including
termination from employment)."
IX. Discipline in the Judicial Branches of the States
State judicial discipline commissions are housed within the
judicial branch of government. These commissions ordinarily do not
have jurisdiction or authority over administrative law judges because
they are in the executive branch of government. The creators of the
commissions implicitly recognized a constitutional separation of
powers problem if the power to hire and fire executive branch
employees (administrative law judges), outside of the context of an
appeal, were bestowed on a judicial discipline commission. Other
than those discussed herein, there are additional judicial discipline
commissions at the state level.8 2

81. Id.
Commission,
Qualifications
Judicial
Florida
82. See
Judicial
Georgia
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pubinfo/jqc.shtml;
Qualifications Commission, http://www.georgiacourts.org/agencies/jqc/; Indiana
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/judCommission,
Qualifications
Judicial
Commission,
Qualifications
Judicial
Iowa
qual/about.html;
http://www.judicial.state.ia.us/SelfHelp/Complaints/AboutJudges/index.asp;
Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications, http://www.kscourts.org/AppellateKentucky
Clerk/GeneraUcommission-on-judicial-qualifications/default.asp;
on
Commission
Maryland
http://courts.ky.gov/jcc/;
Commission,
Conduct
Judicial
Missouri
http://www.mdcourts.gov/cjd/about.html;
Disabilities,
Judicial
and Discipline of Judges,
Removal,
Commission on Retirement,
http://www.courts.mo.gov/SUP/index.nsf/O/d9e62ccOdfa6cfl f86256620005b4f38?
Commission,
Standards
Judicial
Montana
OpenDocument;
http://courts.mt.gov/supreme/boards/jsc.asp; Nebraska Commission on Judicial
Qualifications, http://www.supremecourt.ne.gov; New Hampshire Judicial Conduct
Committee, http://www.courts.state.nh.us/committees/judconductcomm/index.htm;
Conduct,
Judicial
on
Commission
State
York
New
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Common threads of similarity run through judicial discipline
mechanisms in the states. Most commissions are creatures of their
respective state constitutions and their members are appointed by a
constitutionally prescribed mix of individuals, e.g., the chief justice,
the governor, the attorney general, the bar association.
In some cases, the commissions have the power to remove judges
from the bench or impose other discipline. In other cases, the
commissions make recommendations for removal or discipline to the
highest court of the state. In all cases, the commissions function as
tribunals that deal with complaints against judges. They are
constituted to function in a manner similar to an attorney discipline
system, i.e., receiving complaints, handling the complaints
informally, conducting "probable cause" proceedings, and
conducting full blown hearings on the merits where the judge is
afforded the full panoply of due process rights, including the right to
be represented by counsel, the right to discovery, and the right to
have the charging authority prove the allegations against the judge by
a recognized standard of proof, ordinarily by "clear and convincing
evidence."
In appropriate cases, a commission may also provide for
diversion of a judge with mental or substance abuse problems.
Ohio Board of
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Legal%20Authorities/legal.htm;
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, www.sconet.state.oh.us/boc; Oregon
Commission
on
Judicial
Fitness
and
Disability,
www.ojd.state.or.us/aboutus/cjfd/index.htm; Rhode Island Commission on Judicial
Tenure & Discipline, www.courts.state.ri.us/supreme/jtd/defaultjtd.htm; South
Carolina
Commission
on
Judicial
Conduct,
www.judicial.state.sc.us/discCounsel/commissionJC.cfm; South Dakota Judicial
Qualifications
Commission,
http://www.sdjudicial.com/index.asp?category-jqc&nav-O; Tennessee Court of the
Judiciary,
www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPINIONS/TSC/RULES/TNRulesOfCourt/ctjudindex.htm;
Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct, http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/; Utah
Judicial Conduct Commission, http://jcc.utah.gov/aboutus.html; Vermont Judicial
Conduct Board, www.vermontjudiciary.org/Committees/boards/jcbcomplaint.htm;
Virginia
Judicial
Inquiry
&
Review
Commission,
www.courts.state.va.us/jirc/main.htm; Washington State Commission on Judicial
Conduct, www.cjc.state.wa.us; West Virginia Judicial Investigation Commission,
http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/JIC/geninfo.htm; Wisconsin Judicial Commission,
http://www.wicourts.gov/about/committees/judicialcommission/index.htm;
Wyoming Commission on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, http://judicialconductwy.us/const.php (all websites listed supra last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
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Ordinarily, the proceedings are confidential until and unless public
discipline is imposed. The unwritten, inherent reasons for the
confidentiality are that it would not be good to air the dirty linen of
the judiciary in public on a frequent basis because of the great
potential of eroding the public confidence and independent and
competent judiciary. 3
X. Judicial Performance Evaluations in the Administrative Law
Judiciary: Another Form of Accountability
Judicial performance evaluations for administrative law judges,
who are civil servants, are ordinarily performed by a supervisory
ALJ. Using Colorado as an example, primarily as a concession to the
shortness of life, there are three principal tools for the measurement
of performance and the accountability of Colorado administrative law
These tools include: (1) "judgmental" performance
judges.
evaluations mandated by the State Personnel System: (2) an annual,
anonymous ALJ performance survey; and, (3) a "quality assurance
review" program (a developmental, confidential peer process for the
review of decisions).
A. JudgmentalEvaluations ofALJs
Performance criteria for administrative law judges in the Office
of Administrative Courts (Administrative Courts) are included on a
standard form prescribed by the State Department of Personnel and
Administration. 84 There are general criteria for all employees of the
Department, designated as core competencies (communication,
and
skills,
service/interpersonal
customer
86
the
code
to
Adherence
credibility/accountability/job knowledge).
of judicial conduct is measured under the "Core Competency"

83. See Appendix infra, at pp. 24-28.
84. COLO. OFFICE ADMIN. CTS., Performance Management Form (on file with
author).
85. The Colorado Office of Administrative Courts is a division of the State
department of Personnel and Administration. See Colorado Department of
Courts,
Office
of
Administrative
&
Administration,
Personnel
http://www.colorado.gov/dpa/oac/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
86. COLO. OFFICE ADMIN. CTS., supra note 84, at 1 (on file with author).
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Next, there are specific performance measurement
standards."
standards for administrative law judges, including "decision
quality,"8 8 "quality of hearings" 89 ("conducting hearings effectively
and fairly"), and "timeliness of decisions." 90
There are three levels of rating in the Department's and
Administrative Court's Performance Management System: (1)
exceptional; (2) successful; and (3) needs improvement ("needs
improvement" is tantamount to an unsatisfactory rating). An overall
''exceptional" rating results in a non-base building cash bonus for the
year (usually $500). An overall "successful" rating results in the
maximum base building cost-of-living increase for the professional
class of which administrative law judges are a part. An overall
"needs improvement" rating may result in a "corrective action," and
if the ALJ does not meet the goals of the corrective action in the time
specified in the corrective action for meeting those goals, it may
result in dismissal from state service. 9 1
B. Developmental,Anonymous Performance Surveys ofALJs
Besides the "judgmental" performance evaluations of ALJs in
Colorado, the Integrated Document Solutions (IDS) Unit of the State
Department of Personnel and Administration conducts an
anonymous, "developmental" survey of each ALJ, sending out
questionnaires to 2,000 people, selected by IDS, who appeared or
were otherwise present before an administrative law judge for the
year surveyed. 92 Neither the OAC nor the Department of Personnel
and Administration have access to or know the names of those
surveyed; and, they do not have access to the process until the
process is completed.9 3 Respondents to the survey are asked to grade
each ALJ from "A" to "F" (fail) in a number of different performance
areas.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See Appendix infra at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 3 (on file with author).
Id. at 4 (on file with author).
Id.
Id.
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Respondents to the IDS Survey are asked to grade each ALJ,
from "A" to "F", in the following categories: (1) explaining the
proceedings, and what's going on in the hearing; (2) being prepared
for the hearing and familiar with the case; (3) treating all participants
with courtesy and respect; (4) providing adequate time for both sides
to present their case ("allowing the questioning of witnesses without
excessively or unnecessarily interrupting them"); (5) maintaining
appropriate control over proceedings; (6) conducting proceedings in a
neutral manner; (7) demonstrating knowledge of the applicable law;
(8) applying rules of procedure and evidence appropriately; (9)
timeliness of ruling on motions and other pre-hearing matters; (10)
being clear and understandable; (11) showing an understanding of the
issues in the case; (12) addressing all of the legal and factual issues in
the case; (13) giving reasons for decision; (14) timeliness in issuing
post-hearing decision; and, (15) doing a good job overall.
Respondents are then encouraged to make written, anonymous
comments on the administrative law judges' strengths and

weaknesses. 94
C The Quality Assurance Review Program
An additional accountability measure in the Colorado Office of
Administrative Courts involves a "developmental" and confidential
"Quality Assurance Review (QAR)" of decisions by peers. The
QAR program is collegial and non-binding. Judges periodically
submit up to six decisions a year to a colleague for a quality review.
There are seven factors on the QAR Checklist: (1) appropriate title
for decision; (2) clarity of language; (3) clarity of format; (4)
grammar; (5) findings of fact support conclusions of law; (6) findings
of fact properly distinguished from conclusions of law; and, (7) legal
reasoning and citations to authority. 95

94. COLO. OFFICE ADMIN. CTs., Performance Survey (on file with author).
95. COLO. OFFICE ADMIN. CTS., Quality Assurance Review Program (on file
with author).
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XI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS OF JUDGES IN THE JUDICIAL
BRANCH

Originally, judicial performance evaluations were performed by
bar associations for the purpose of imparting meaningful information
on a judge's performance to the voting public. These evaluations
were "developmental" (non-binding) and the results were for the
judge's and the public's edification so the under performing judge
could develop better judicial attributes. Now, many states have
established official judicial performance evaluation commissions,
often constituted in a manner quite similar to the manner judicial
discipline commissions are constituted. These commissions have
taken the place of bar association surveys, but they have far more
clout. A judge with problem surveys is generally required to meet
with the commission and address the problems indicated. One
example of how a judicial performance commission functions was a
situation where the public survey revealed that a judge, who shall
remain unnamed, had an anger problem. The commission met with
the judge and gave him an opportunity to respond. After the meeting,
the commission and the judge agreed that the judge would attend
anger management classes. This fact later appeared in the local
newspaper, not because there was a leak, but because the
commission's actions, for the most part, are deemed a matter of
public record. In most instances, the outcomes are made public.
XII. INAPPROPRIATE JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
Despite (1) the widespread existence of constraints on judicial
behavior, both public and private, (2) judicial discipline mechanisms
and criteria for discipline, and (3) judicial evaluation mechanisms
and criteria for evaluations, most of which is available to the public
in order that it may make informed decisions on the retention or
reelection of judges, there continues to be a public clamor for more
accountability. The public sometimes does not seem to be quite sure
of what kind of accountability they mean, or of what precise
problems require more accountability. They just seem to know that
those "darned judges go against the public will, make unreasonable
decisions, and are accountable to no one the way legislators and other
elected officials are accountable."
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The U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White 96 opened the door to the potential of more
inappropriate judicial accountability measures. Essentially, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the "announce clause" in the Minnesota
Supreme Court's canon of judicial conduct, which prohibited
candidates for judicial election from announcing their views on
disputed legal or political issues, violated the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution." Although an application of Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White is limited to judicial election and reelection
campaigns, the U.S. Supreme Court effectively determined that the
First Amendment trumps state codes of judicial conduct concerning
extra-judicial statements of judges in their campaigns. 98
James Bopp, Jr., a Terre Haute, Indiana lawyer, who successfully
argued Republican Party of Minnesota v. White before the U.S.
Supreme Court, is on a crusade to eliminate prohibitions "against
judicial candidates making 'pledges,' 'promises' or 'commitments'
on controversies or issues that are inconsistent with impartiality on
the bench." 99 Mr. Bopp is also challenging judicial canons that
prohibit "partisan political activities and direct solicitation of
campaign funds" by judicial "candidates." He states, "While his
clients want to know a candidate's personal values on issues such as
abortion, they expect judges to follow the facts and law wherever
they lead." 00 According to Mr. Bopp, "judicial candidates can be
prohibited from saying 'I'll throw all drunk drivers in jail' or 'I'll
overturn Roe v. Wade if given the chance .... ."'lot
Mr. Bopp's argument is disingenuous. It maintains that unless
the judge announces a clear-cut pre-judgment, outright, e.g., "I'll
overturn Roe v. Wade as soon as I get a chance," the judge can
publicly express whatever controversial views he so desires without
exposure to any consequences. Presumably, a logical extension of
Mr. Bopp's argument is that the First Amendment trumps the ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct (2007), and its state counterparts,
96. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
97. Id. at 788.
98. Id.
99. Terry Carter, The Big Bopper: This Terre Haute Lawyer is Exploding the
Cannons ofJudicial CampaignEthics, 92 A.B.A. J. 30, 32-33 (Nov. 2008).
100. Id. at 33.
10 1. Id.
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which provide that a judge should not "participate in activities that
will lead to frequent disqualification of the judge."' 0 2 The underlying
rationale of the argument would also appear to be at odds with the
judicial ethics value of "helping one's colleagues with their
caseloads."
Indeed, it is not that difficult to imagine the loneliest judge on the
bench, who has received substantial reelection contributions from the
Right-to-Life Committee, The Sons of Italy, and MADD (Mothers
Against Drunk Driving) and who, in the exercise of her First
Amendment right to speak publicly about controversial issues, says
that she has very strong feelings against abortion, stem cell research,
political demonstrators against our patriotic Columbus Day Parade,
drunk drivers, and others. Thereafter, she gets a rash of cases
involving any one or more of these controversial issues. The judge is
then faced with motions to disqualify herself. Arguably, she could
deny the motions, stating that, despite the political contributions and
despite the public announcement of her strongly held views, she will
be fair and impartial because she never said that she would rule
against abortion clinics, drunk drivers, criminals, or Native American
demonstrators at the Columbus Day Parade.
An appeals court may, however, reverse her on the basis that she
should have disqualified herself; thus, the parties would have to go
back to square one with another judge. Based on this scenario, the
lonely judge could wind up being not very busy, and her colleagues
would have to shoulder the added load resulting from her frequent
disqualifications, triggered by the reversal of her previous refusal to
disqualify herself.
Nevertheless, under Mr. Bopp's inherent argument, the First
Amendment may trump the judge's ethical obligation to "cooperate
with other judges and court officials in the administration of court
business."l03 Indeed, one can imagine judicial campaign rhetoric,
reminiscent of the movie Hang 'Em High, starring Clint Eastwood
and Pat Hingle, stating, "elect me and I'll string 'em up high"
(regardless of any considerations or factors contained in the
Probation Department's pre-sentence report, or other considerations

102. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3.1(B) (2007).
103. Id. at Canon 2.5(B).
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concerning the imposition of an appropriate sentence based on the
facts and the law).
Mr. Bopp is forcing the issue of judges' views on controversial
political issues with the use of interest-group questionnaires being
sent to judges up for retention or re-election, and to their challengers.
The message behind the questionnaires is "judge, you can no longer
hide behind the code of judicial conduct, in light of the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, and if
you decline to answer what my client constituency wants to know,
it'll most likely cost you their votes."1 0 4
The receipt of the political questionnaire forces a different kind of
accountability, such as: Is the respondent-judge the interest group's
kind of judge? The other side of the controversy concerning the
controversial political issue may have a problem with the judge's
fairness and impartiality on that issue.
XIII. CONCLUSION
The central question is whether we truly want judges who are
politically accountable to the political clamor of the moment. If so, it
may be better to have a legislative body, which represents
constituencies of the public, vote on the resolution of specific
controversies between litigants. Legislators are better suited to
withstand the slings and arrows of public opinion. And, if they are
wrong they can be tossed out of office in the next regular election.
This is not what the founding fathers intended when they set up a
system of separate but equal branches of government, with checks
and balances. Indeed, the real strength of the United States is
embedded in the legal mechanisms designed to respect the rights of
minorities, no matter how unpopular or repugnant to the majority the
exercise of those rights may be.
Indeed, if we could read the deepest hopes and values in the
hearts of people in this country, we would find evidence that the
judicial independence of their judges is a cherished value. We may
find that Jane Q. Citizen believes that she has a chance to win against
big government or big business or, in the case of administrative law,
the big agency. We may also find an appreciation of the fact that

104. See Carter,supra note 99, at 34.
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judges are far more accountable than any other public official in the
legislative or executive branch of government. We may find an
appreciation of the proposition that "with great responsibility comes
great accountability."
The isolated horror stories in the press,
concerning a few cases of extreme judicial misbehavior, and what
happens to the misbehaving judges, illustrate that judges are
accountable. Things do not end well for these judges.
Judges themselves must constantly create, develop and
implement accountability measures and mechanisms that demonstrate
to the public the high degree of accountability to which they are
subject. Like Caesar's wife, they must at all times be above
reproach, not only refraining from improprieties, but avoiding even
the appearanceof impropriety, despite the fact that they are human
beings and heir to the frailties of the flesh.10 5 The continued wellbeing of our system of government is dependent upon independent
judges who are accountable to "reasoned elaboration," (i.e., giving
reasons for their decisions); to being appealed and reversed if they
make a legally wrong decisions; and to an appropriate code of
judicial conduct that ensures that their conduct is above reproach;
that they are fair and impartial to all; and, that they dispatch judicial
business in a timely fashion. Judges have a continuing mission to
educate the public that it is in their best interests to make sure that
inappropriate judicial accountability measures are clarified so the
public that cherishes judicial independence can see the measures for
what they are, to get judges who are bought and paid for by one
interest group or another.106 By the same token, judges have an
obligation to constantly demonstrate to the public that they are
accountable to fairness, propriety, and the rule of law.

105. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1.2, which states: "A
judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety." When faced with removing "the
appearance of Impropriety" language from the Rule, the National Conference of
State Chief Justices voted to leave it in. See Mark I. Harrison, The 2007 Model
Code of Judicial Conduct: Blueprintfor a Generation of Judges, 28 JUST. SYS. J.
257, 262 (2007).
106. See JUDGE RICHARD FRUIN, JUDICIAL OUTREACH ON A SHOESTRING: A
WORKING MANUAL (Judicial Division, ABA 1999).
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APPENDIX

This appendix expands on the discussions in three of this article's
sections: "Discipline in the Judicial Branches of the States"l 0 7 1
"Judgmental Evaluation of ALJs"' 0 8 ; and "Performance Evaluations
of Judges in the Judicial Branch." 09
First, "Discipline in the Judicial Branches of the States" provides
an overview of eighteen states' mechanisms for judicial discipline,
and includes citations for interested readers.
Second, "Judgmental Evaluation of ALJs" gives a full account of
the criteria used by the Office of Administrative Courts for
judgmental evaluations. Because of the difficulty of obtaining the
source for these criteria (it is on file with the author), the pertinent
parts of its text are included here.
Finally, "Performance Evaluations of Judges in the Judicial
Branch" discusses, in greater depth than the main text, Colorado's
performance evaluation system for judges in the judicial branch, and
then surveys thirteen other states' judicial performance evaluation
mechanisms.
A. Discipline in the JudicialBranches of the States
The Constitution of the State of Alabama establishes a Court of
the Judiciary, consisting of one appellate judge, two judges of circuit
courts, one district judge, two members of the state bar, two nonlawyers appointed by the Governor, and one person appointed by the
Lieutenant Governor.11 0 The Court of the Judiciary has authority,
after notice and public hearing:
(1) to remove from office, suspend without pay, or
censure a judge, or apply such other sanction . . . for
violation of a Canon of Judicial Ethics, misconduct in
office, failure to perform his or her duties, or (2) to
suspend with or without pay, or to retire a judge who

107. See discussion supra Part VIII.
108. See discussion supra Part IX.A.
109. See discussion supra Part X.
I10. ALA. CONST. art. VI,

§ 157.
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is physically or mentally unable to perform his or her
duties."'
The Alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct consists of three
judge members, three attorney members and three public members."12
Under the Commission's Rules of Procedure, Rule 15 (a), the
Commission may recommend a full range of sanctions, up to and
including removal from office, to the Supreme Court of Alaska." 3
The Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct was created in
1970.1 14 It consists of eleven members with diverse backgrounds.
Six judge members are appointed by the state supreme court: two
from the court of appeals, two from the superior court, one from a
justice court, and one from a municipal court." 5 Two attorney
members are appointed by the board of governors of the State Bar of
Arizona. Three public members who cannot be attorneys, or active
or retired judges, are appointed by the governor and confirmed by the
state senate. 11 6 The Commission enabling provisions explicitly state
that it "does not have jurisdiction over court employees,
administrative law judges or federal judges."" 7 The commission
may reprimand an Arizona judicial branch judge informally for
violating the Code of Judicial Conduct, or in some cases, the
commission may file formal charges and hold a public hearing to
consider evidence about the judge's conduct. If it finds that the judge
committed misconduct, the commission can recommend that the state
supreme court censure, suspend without pay, or remove the judge
from office."

I11. Id.
112. Alaska
Comm'n
on
Judicial
Conduct,
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/CONDUCT.htm (last visited Oct. 18).
113. Alaska
Judicial
Conduct
Comm'n
Rules,
http://www.state.ak.us/courts/jcc.htm#15 (last visited Oct 18).
114. Arizona
Comm'n
on
Judicial
Conduct,
http://www.supreme.state.az.us/ethics/Commission on JudicialConductOvervie
w.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
115. ARIZ. CONST. art. 6.1 § 1.
116. Arizona
Comm'n
on
Judicial
Conduct,
http://www.supreme.state.az.us/ethics/Commission on JudicialConductOvervie
w.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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The Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission of Arkansas
may reprimand or censure a judge or, after notice and hearing and by
majority vote, may recommend to the supreme court that a judge or
justice be suspended, with or without pay, or be removed. Through
silence, the Commission has jurisdiction and authority over
constitutional judges but not over administrative law judges. In a
hearing involving a justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court, all
justices shall be disqualified from participation.'' 9
The California Commission on Judicial Performance 2 0 hears
cases involving judicial misconduct,121 handles judicial disability
retirement applications,122 and is responsible for enforcement of the
restrictions on judges' receipt of gifts and honoraria.12 3 It has
jurisdiction over California constitutional judges.
The Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline consists of two
judges of district courts and two judges of county courts, each
selected by the supreme court; two licensed attorneys appointed by
the governor with the advice and consent of the state senate; and four
citizens, none of whom shall be a judge, active or retired nor
admitted to practice law, appointed by the governor with the consent
of the senate.124
By virtue of its constitutional status, the
Commission has jurisdiction over constitutional judges but not over
executive branch statutory judges (administrative law judges). The
Commission may order a formal hearing concerning discipline and, if
the charges are substantiated, may recommend to the Colorado
Supreme Court removal, retirement, suspension, censure, reprimand,

or discipline.12 5
In Connecticut, the Judicial Review Council was created by
statute.126 It has jurisdiction of judicial officers, including state
referees, within the judicial branch.1 27 The Commission has the

119. ARK. CONST. Amend. 66(a), (c).
120. CAL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 8, 18-18.1 18.5; CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 68701-

68756 (West 2008).
121. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18 (i).
122. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 75060-75064.
123. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 170.9.
124. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 23(3)(a).
125. Id. § 23(3)(e).
126. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-51g (2008).
127. Id. § 51-51h.
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authority to recommend removal of a judge to the Connecticut

Supreme Court.128
The Judiciary Commission of Louisiana has jurisdiction over
justices and judges of all courts, including commissioners,
magistrates, justices of the peace, and mayors performing judicial

functions.1 29
The Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission "strives to hold state
judges, magistrates, and referees accountable for their misconduct
without jeopardizing or compromising the essential independence of
the judiciary. The basis for Commission action is a violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct or Rules of Professional Conduct .... "1 3 0
The Massachusetts Commission on Judicial Conduct has
jurisdiction over all judges in the judicial branch. Grounds for
discipline include, inter alia,
(c) willful misconduct which, although not related to
judicial duties, brings the judicial office into disrepute;
(d) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice
or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer, whether
conduct in office or outside judicial duties, that brings
the judicial office into disrepute; or (e) any conduct
that constitutes a violation of the codes of judicial
conduct or professional responsibility.131
A majority of the Commission members may recommend
discipline to the supreme judicial court, up to and including removal

from office.' 32
Minnesota's 1971 Legislature created a Board on Judicial
Standards to assist the Supreme Court1 33 and to implement the
constitutional removal or discipline of judges for cause.134 The
Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted the Minnesota Code of

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. § 51-51j.
LA. CONST. art. V, § 25.
MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 30; MICH. CT. R. 9.200.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211C § 2 (2008).
Id. § 7 (10).
MINN. STAT. §§ 490A.01-.02 (2008).
MINN. CONST. art. 6, § 9.
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Judicial Conduct that applies, by statute, to Minnesota's central panel
of the administrative law judiciary.13 5
The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance may
recommend to the state supreme court a public censure or reprimand
through removal from office for misconduct including, inter alia,
(c) willful and persistent failure to perform ... duties;

(d) habitual intemperance in the use of alcohol or
other drugs; or (e) conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice which brings the judicial
office into disrepute; and may retire involuntarily any
justice or judge for physical or mental disability
seriously interfering with the performance of his
duties, which disability is likely to become of a
permanent character.' 36
The website of the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline
states that it does not have the authority to consider complaints
concerning legal errors, alleged to have been made by a judge: "That
is the role of the Appellate Court system." 3 7
The Judicial Standards Commission of New Mexico' 3 8 conducts
hearings on judicial misconduct complaints and may recommend to
the Supreme Court removal from office or retirement of a judge or
magistrate.
North Carolina's constitution provides for the impeachment of
judges, 139 but statutory law provides for the investigation and
resolution of inquiries concerning the qualification or conduct of any
judge, including the procedure for discipline before the Judicial
Standards Commission. 140
The Oklahoma Council on Judicial Complaints has jurisdiction
over all persons subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct, including

135. MINN. STAT. § 14.48 (3)(d).
136. MIss. CONST. art. VI, § 177A.
137. State of Nevada Comm'n on Judicial Discipline, Purpose of the
Commission, http://judicial.state.nv.us/purposenjdc3new.htm (last visited Oct. 18,
2008); see NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 21(5); NEV. REV. STAT. § 1.4677 (2008).
138. N.M. CONST., art. VI, § 32; see also N.M. STAT §§ 34-10-1 to -4 (2008).
139. N.C. CONsT. art. IV, §§ 4, 17.
140. N.C. STAT. §§ 7A-374.1 to -378 (2008).
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state, municipal and administrative law judges.141 If any part of the
administrative law judiciary in Oklahoma were subject to the Code of
Judicial Conduct, by statute, the judicial branch would ostensibly
have jurisdiction and authority to remove an AU serving in the
executive branch. Such a situation would appear to violate the
constitutional separation of powers doctrine, whereby the judicial
branch commission would be in the position of functioning as the
ultimate appointing authority for executive branch AU found
culpable of misconduct.
The Pennsylvania Judicial Conduct Board as part of the judiciary
is an independent entity having its own constitutional and statutory
provisions regarding proceedings. 142
The website of the Washington State Commission on Judicial
Conduct states:
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have
judicial conduct agencies to receive and investigate
allegations of judicial misconduct. These agencies
only act on complaints involving judicial misconduct
and disability. They do not43serve as appellate courts
reviewingjudges' rulings."I
B. JudgmentalEvaluations ofALJs
The criteria for "quality of decisions" includes three principal
"well written;" and (3)
groupings: (1) "well reasoned;" (2)
reasoned" includes
"Well
law."
by
applicable
"supported
''conclusions are supported by applicable law"; and "reasoning
employed is understandable, logical and persuasive."144 "
written" includes eleven criteria:

141. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n, Oklahoma Council on Judicial Complaints,
http://www.okbar.org/publicljudges/council.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
142. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18; see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2101-2106 (2008).
143. Washington State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, Background,
http://www.cjc.state.wa.us/AboutCJC/background.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2008)
(emphasis added).
144. COLO. OFFICE ADMIN. CTS., supra note 84, at 1 (on file with author).
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(1)rationale for decision is clear and understandable;
(2) paragraphs and sentences are properly structured;
(3) paragraphs and sentences are logically related to
each other and in an order which lends itself to a clear
understanding of the discussion; (4) decision employs
correct grammar and spelling; (5) format of decision
assists the reader to understand the conclusions
reached and their underlying rationale; (6) specific
findings of fact are made and cover all material factual
areas; (7) decision deals with all significant arguments
raised by the parties (to the extent determinable from
the four corners of the decision); (8) decision avoids
use of intemperate or injudicious language or
language that indicates bias; (9) findings of fact are
properly distinguished from conclusions of law; (10)
issues are understandable; and, (11) title of decision is

appropriate.1 45
The general criterion of "supported by applicable law" includes:
(1) "relevant or controlling statutes, judicial and administrative
decisions, and regulations are considered"; and (2) "authorities cited
support the propositions for which they are cited."l 46
The criteria for "conducting hearings effectively and fairly are
divided into six major groupings: (1) "opening remarks in merits
hearings"; (2) "control of proceedings/demeanor"; (3) "handling of
exhibits"; (4) "questioning of witnesses"; (5) "ruling on motions and
objections"; and (6) "closing the hearing." 47 The "opening remarks"
grouping is broken down into ten criteria: (1) identifies case; (2)
permits parties/counsel to enter appearances or identifies them; (3)
allows opportunity for preliminary matters or questions; (4) allows
opportunity for opening statements; (5) identifies self; (6) states date;
(7) defines issues; (8) indicates party bearing burden of proof; (9)
describes hearing procedures; and, (10) explains and seeks waiver of
right to counsel, if appropriate.1"'

145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. (on file with author).
COLO. OFFICE ADMIN. CTS., supra note 84, at 4 (on file with author).
Id. at 5 (on file with author).
Id.
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The "control of proceedings/demeanor" grouping is broken down
into eleven criteria:
(1) begins hearing promptly at beginning of day and
after recesses (or explains any unavoidable delay); (2)
controls hearing in firm but fair manner, including
interactions of participants; (3) evidences familiarity
with file and adequate preparation; (4) permits off-therecord discussions only when justified and makes
record of discussions; (5) treats litigants, counsel and
witnesses with respect and courtesy; (6) provides
appropriate explanations/guidance to self-represented
litigants; (7) uses no intemperate or injudicious
language or language that indicates bias; (8) shows no
favoritism to one party over another; (9) makes effort
to make parties and witnesses feel at ease; (10)
accommodates special needs of participants; and (11)
is attentive to proceedings.14 9
The "handling of exhibits" grouping is broken down into five
criteria:
(1) ensures exhibits are marked and identified; (2)
ensures copy of exhibits available to other party; (3)
makes supportable rulings on admissibility of exhibits;
(4) has system of recording exhibits admitted or
excluded; and (5) collects/receives all exhibits offered
and not withdrawn.1 50
The "questioning of witnesses" grouping includes five criteria:
(1) administers oath; (2) permits cross, redirect, and
re-cross of witnesses; (3) offers opportunity for
rebuttal and surrebuttal; (4) limits number of own
questions, asks questions that do not reflect bias, only
questions when necessary (to clarify), avoids

149. Id.
150. Id.
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questions that reflect advocacy; and (5) encourages
when
of
witnesses,
examination
efficient
appropriate. 151
The "ruling on motions and objections" grouping sets forth two
criteria: (1) rules on all motions and objections; and (2) rulings are
supportable. 1 52 The "closing the hearing" is a criterion that is defined
as: "Offers the opportunity for closing statements in merits hearings
and indicates procedure for issuance of the decision." 53
The "timeliness of decisions" criterion is described as follows:
"To issue decisions, dispositive orders and orders upon remand
within the time limits set forth by statute, regulation or Office of
Administrative Courts policy." 54 To receive an "exceptional"
performance rating, in this category, for any given performance year,
an AU must issue "no unexcused late orders, a majority of decisions
were issued ahead of time, and the judge had a higher than average
workload."' 55 For a "successful" rating, an AU is required to have
"issued no more than two unexcused late orders" for the performance
year.156 An AU who "issued three or more unexcused late orders"
would receive a "needs improvement" rating.157
C. PerformanceEvaluations ofJudges in the JudicialBranch
1. Colorado
Colorado first established judicial performance evaluation
commissions in 1988.158 The Colorado General Assembly created a
state commission on judicial performance' 59 to develop techniques
for evaluating judges and to make recommendations concerning the
retention of justices of the Supreme Court, and judges of the court of

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
COLO. OFFICE ADMIN. CTS., supra note 84, at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.

156. Id.
157. COLO. OFFICE ADMIN. CTS., supra note 84, at 5.
158. COLO. REv .STAT. § 13-5.5-102 (2008).
159. Id. § 13-5.5-103.
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appeals. 1 60 The Colorado Legislature also created commissions on
judicial performance for each judicial district in the state.' 6 ' These
district commissions are empowered to interview judges and other
appropriate persons, accept information and documentation from
interested parties, conduct public hearings,162 and make
recommendations on the retention of district and county court

judges.163
The 2008 Colorado General Assembly established an Office of
Judicial Performance Evaluation in the Judicial Department.1 64 This
new law spells out explicit review duties of the commissions,
including the review of decisions.' 65 It also details performance
criteria upon which judges are reviewed.166 The criteria for the state
commission and the district commissions are as follows:
(a) integrity, including but not limited to whether: (I)
the justice or judge avoids impropriety or the
appearance of impropriety; (II) the justice or judge
displays fairness and impartiality toward all
participants; and (1II) the justice or judge avoids ex
parte communications; (b) legal knowledge, including
but not limited to whether: (I) . . . opinions are well-

reasoned and demonstrate an understanding of
substantive law and the relevant rules of procedure
and evidence;

(II)

. . .

opinions

demonstrate

attentiveness to factual and legal issues before the
court; and (III) . . . opinions adhere to precedent or

clearly explain the legal basis for departure from
precedent: (c) communication skills, including but not
limited to whether: (I) ... opinions are clearly written
and understandable, and (II) . . . questions or

statements during oral arguments are clearly stated
and understandable; (d) judicial temperament,
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. § 13-5.5-106.
Id. § 13-5.5-104.
Id. § 13-5.5-105.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-5.5-106.

164. Id. § 13-5.5-101.5.
165. Id.

§ 13-5.5-103(1)(a) - (q).

166. Id. § 13-5.5-105.5.
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including but not limited to whether: (I) . . .
demonstrates courtesy toward attorneys, litigants,
court staff, and others in the courtroom; and (II) ...
maintains appropriate decorum in the courtroom; (e)
administrative performance, including but not limited
to whether: (I) .

.

. demonstrates preparation for oral

argument, attentiveness, and appropriate control over
judicial proceedings; (II) . . . manages workload
effectively; (III) . . . issues opinions in a timely

manner and without unnecessary delay, and (IV)
participates in a proportionate share of the court's
workload; (f) service to legal profession and the public
by participating in service-oriented efforts designed to
educate the public about the legal system and to
improve the legal system.' 67
A few differences in the stated criteria for the district
commissions include: Subsection (b) (11) "the judge appropriately
applies statutes, judicial precedent, and other sources of legal
authority"; Subsection (c) (II) "the judge's oral presentations are
clearly stated and understandable and the judge clearly explains all
oral decisions; and (III) the judge clearly presents information to the
jury"; Subsection (d) (II) "the judge maintains and requires order,
punctuality, and decorum in the courtroom"; Subsection (e) (II) "the
judge uses court time efficiently . . . (IV) the judge effectively
manages cases . . . (V) the judge takes responsibility for more than
his or her own caseload and is willing to assist other judges, and (VI)
the judge understands and complies with directives of the Colorado

Supreme Court."
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2. Other States
Based on available information, judicial branch performance
evaluation (as opposed to judicial discipline) mechanisms are

167. Id. § 13-5.5-105.5(1)(a) - (f), (2)(a) - (f).
168. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-5.5-105.5.
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discussed for several (twelve) but not all twenty of the states having

such mechanisms.169
Arizona's Commission on Judicial Performance review has
thirty-four members appointed by the Supreme Court, who are: (1)
public members; (2) attorneys; (3) judges; and, (4) legislators.17 0 The
duties of the Commission are:
(1)(a) to develop, review and recommend amendments
on written performance standards, to be approved by
the Supreme Court; (b) to formulate policies and
procedures for collecting information and conducting
reviews; and to create and supervise a program of
periodic review of the performance of each judge and
justice who is subject to the merit selection system;
(2) to identify key areas where improvement is needed
and work with the Committee on Judicial Education
and Training to prioritize areas and offer required
courses to meet educational needs; and, (3) to request
public comment and hold public hearings on the
performance of all judges and justices subject to
retention.71

The California Commission on Judicial Performance consists of
one judge of a court of appeal and two judges of superior courts, each
appointed by the Supreme Court; two members of the State Bar of
California, who have practiced law for ten years, each appointed by
the Governor; and six citizens who are not judges, retired judges, or
attorneys, two of whom are appointed by the Governor; two by the
Senate Committee on Rules; and two by the Speaker of the

Assembly.172

169. Alaska, Arizona, California, [Colorado has been discussed at length],
Connecticut, Hawaii, Kansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.
170. ARIZ.
JUD.
PERF.
REV.
R.
2
(2006),
available at
http://azjudges.info/about/procedure.cfm.
171. Id. at 2(g)(1)(a) - (g)(3).
172. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 8.
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The Connecticut Judicial Selection Committee 7 3 is charged with
making a performance evaluation of any judge made by the Judicial
Department available to members of the legislative joint standing
committee on the judiciary prior to any public hearing on the
nomination of any such judge and to the members of the Judicial
Selection Commission.174
The Supreme Court of Hawaii has established a Judicial
Performance Program. Its stated goal is ". . . the periodic evaluation

of a judge's performance is a reliable method to promote judicial
"All full-time, part-time and
excellence and competence."' 7 5
specially appointed justices and judges are subject to the exclusive
evaluation processes of the supreme court and the special committee
to be appointed by the Chief Justice .... ",176
The Kansas Commission on Judicial Performance is charged with
implementing the following functions: (1) "creating surveys of court
users who have directly observed judges' or justices' performance or
interacted with" judges or justices, including attorneys, litigants,
jurors or other persons the Commission deems appropriate ("the
surveys shall ask those surveyed to evaluate the" judge's "ability,
integrity, impartiality, communication skills, professionalism,
temperament and administrativecapacity suitable to the jurisdiction
and level of court"); (2) developing "clear, measurable performance
standards upon which the survey questions are based"; (3)
developing dissemination plans; (4) protecting "confidentiality when
the judicial performance evaluation is used only for selfimprovement"; (5) making "the judicial performance evaluation
results widely available when they are to be used to assist voters in
evaluating the performance of judges and justices subject to retention
elections"; (6) making "public recommendations regarding whether
or not to retain judges or justices subject to retention elections"; (7)
developing "a procedure for judges and justices to receive and
respond to survey results before such results are made public"; and,

173. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 51-44a (2008).
174. Id.
19.1
CT.
R.
SUP.
175. HAW.
http://www.state.hi.us/jud/ctrules/rsch.htm.
19.2
R.
CT.
Sup.
176. HAW.
http://www.state.hi.us/jud/ctruies/rsch.htm.

(1996),

available

at

(2002),

available

at
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(8) establishing "a mechanism to incorporate evaluation results in
designing judicial education programs."' 77
A majority of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts itself,
in consultation with the chief justice, is responsible for the
performance evaluation program for judges in Massachusetts.17 The
program includes, but is not limited to, a questionnaire to be designed
and implemented by the supreme judicial court and given to
attorneys, parties, and jurors appearing before a judge so they may
evaluate the judge. 179 The questionnaire "shall include, but not be
limited to, questions relative to the judge's performance, demeanor,
judicial management skills, legal ability, attentiveness, bias and
degree of preparedness."' 80 Massachusetts further provides for a
similar performance evaluation system for all civil service employees,
which would include administrative magistrates in Massachusetts'
central panel.18'
The chief justice and a majority of the New Hampshire Supreme
Court, in consultation with the administrative judges (judicial branch)
of the superior, district, and probate courts, are responsible for
designing and implementing by court rule, a program for
performance evaluation of judges.' 82 The program includes a
questionnaire and a self-evaluation form to be completed by the
judge. The questionnaire includes questions relative to "the judge's
performance, temperament and demeanor, judicial management
skills, legal knowledge, attentiveness, bias and objectivity, and
degree of preparedness."' 8 3 "Upon consideration of nomination for
another judicial appointment," a judge's performance evaluation is
made available to the governor upon request. 184
The administrative judge (a judicial branch judge with
administrative duties) of a superior court is charged with evaluating
each justice and marital master a minimum of once every three

177. KAN. STAT. § 20-3204 (a)-(e) (2006), amended by 2008 Kan. Sess. Laws
Ch. 145 (H.B. No. 2642).
178. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211 § 26 (2008).
179. Id. § 26A.
180. Id.
181. See id. ch. 31 § 6A.
182. N.H. REv. STAT. § 490:32(I) (2008).
183. Id. § 490:32(11).
184. Id. §490:32(V)(b).
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years.' 85 The administrative judge of a district court and a probate
court must evaluate judges of those courts a minimum of once every

three years.186
The judicial evaluation process in New Hampshire consists of:
(1) a "review of complaints about the judge"; (2) a review of the
completed questionnaires; (3) a review of the self-evaluation
completed by the judge; (4) a summary of the results of the
evaluation, "which identifies any judicial performance standard that
has not been met and sets forth the steps the judge" must take to
improve performance; (5) a meeting between the person performing
the evaluation and the judge to discuss the results of the evaluation to
advise "whether the judge has met the applicable performance
standards and, if not, to identify the steps the judge" must take to
improve performance; and "within 30 days of the meeting," the judge
"may submit a written response to the evaluation."18 7
If performance standards have not been met by a New Hampshire
judge and the judge "has failed to take steps to improve the
performance specified in the evaluation summary, the chief justice or
the administrative judge" of the court on which the judge "serves
may take steps to correct non-compliance, including administrative
discipline," and "whatever other steps are necessary to ensure
compliance."' 8 8
The judicial performance evaluation process is confidential 89
unless and until the judge "fails to meet performance standards for
two consecutive" evaluations, the judge "is deemed to have waived
any right to confidentiality," and the results of the evaluation are
made public, "with the exception of the identity of persons furnishing
information about the judge."' 90
New Jersey's central panel, the Office of Administrative Law,
charges the director and chief administrative law judge with
developing and implementing a program of judicial evaluation,
focusing on three principal areas of judicial performance:

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

N.H. Sup. CT. Rule 56(1I)(A) (2008).
Id.
Id. at 56(II)(B).
Id. at 56(11)(D)(3).
Id. at 56(IV)(A).
Id. at 56(IV)(B)(3).
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65

The evaluations

[I]ndustry and promptness in adhering to schedules,
making rulings and rendering decisions; tolerance,
courtesy, patience, attentiveness, and self-control in
dealing with litigants, witnesses and counsel, and in
presiding over contested cases; legal skills and
knowledge of the law and new legal developments;
analytical talents and writing abilities; settlement
skills; quantity, nature and quality of caseload
disposition; and, impartiality and conscientiousness.1 92
The New Mexico Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission,
in evaluating a judge's performance, may consider: (1) "an analysis
of a judge's results from completed surveys"; (2) "a review of a
judge's workload, conformance with judicial time standards, the
number of excusals and recusals, cases pending and cases
completed"; (3) "any findings and recommendations of the Judicial
Standards Commission and Supreme Court on extrajudicial conduct
that reflected adversely on the judiciary"; (4) surveys; (5) interviews;
and, (6) "any other information deemed appropriate by the
commission."193
The criteria for evaluation in New Mexico are:
(A) integrity and impartiality:
(1) the judge's conduct is free from impropriety or
the appearance of impropriety; (2) the judge
makes findings of fact and interpretation of law
without regard for the possibility of public
criticism; (3) the judge treats all parties equally
and fairly regardless of race, national or ethnic
origin, religion, gender, social or economic status
or disability; (4) the judge's behavior is consistent
and free from the appearance of favoritism; (5) the
outcome of cases is not prejudged; and, (6) the
191. N.J. STAT. § 52:14F-5.s (2008).
192. Id.
193. N.M.R. PERF. EVAL. COMM. Rule 28-301(A)-(F) (2008).
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judge's actions and decisions display basic
fairness and justice;
(B) knowledge and understanding of the law:
(1) the applicable rules of procedure; (2) the rules
of evidence; (3) substantive law; and, (4) the
ability to understand the facts presented and apply
the law to those facts;
(C) communication skills:
(1) the sensitivity of the judge to the impact of the
judge's nonverbal communications; (2) the
courtesy and fairness displayed to all parties and
participants in proceedings; (3) whether the
judge's verbal communications are clear, complete
and logical; and (4) whether a judge's written
communications are clear, complete and logical;
(D) case management:
(1) discharging responsibilities diligently; (2)
meeting time commitments and acting as promptly
and efficiently as possible in scheduling and
disposition of cases; (3) considering the
availability of settlement and alternative resolution
processes and the cost of litigation; (4) punctuality
and efficient use of time; and (5) maintenance or
proper control over the courtroom.1 94
The New Mexico Commission may conduct interviews with
persons who have appeared before a judge on a regular basis; observe
a judge in the performance of duty in the courtroom; and evaluate
statistical information on a judge.' 95
Rhode Island has a Judicial Performance Evaluation Committee,
appointed by the Supreme Court, to develop and administer, under
the court's supervision, "a program for the continuing evaluation of
judicial performance."' 96
Utah has a Standing Committee on Judicial Performance
Evaluation that uses "professionally recognized methods of data

194. Id. at 28-401(A)-(D).
195. Id. at 28-204 (F)-(H).
196. R.I. SUP. CT. art. VI, Rule 4.1(a) (2008).
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collection that may include surveys, onsite visits, caseload
management data and personal interviews."l 9 7
The Supreme Court of Virginia is responsible for establishing and
maintaining "a judicial performance evaluation program that will
provide a self-improvement mechanism for judges and a source of
information for the reelection process."' 98

197. UT. R. J. ADMIN RULE 2-106.05(1) (2008).

198. VA. CODE § 17.1-100 (2008).
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